You have to market peace like you would a business idea – Arin Melikyan

“The conflict itself is over and now the bargaining is underway”.

Pressklub.az interviewed manager of the joint peacebuilding project Crossroads, Arin Melikyan (Yerevan)

— How would you assess the current state of the peace process between Baku and Yerevan? Can it be described as satisfactory?

— There’s no proper peace process yet, there are just individual gestures of goodwill. But the joint statement issued by the two countries’ foreign ministries in December and the subsequent prisoner exchange does inspire hope. Because, as far as I can remember, this is the first time direct talks have taken place between the two sides, without any mediators. At least we know now that the parties can meet and agree on something. But it’s too early to talk about any kind of peace process at the moment. The two sides see peace differently and the conditions for peace envisaged by one side may not be acceptable to the other.

Essentially, the conflict as such is over and now the bargaining has begun. What I have noticed is that the rhetoric from Baku is softening. There are threats, of course, but at the same time, if you follow the Azerbaijani media, you can see that the language in relation to Armenia has become softer. And I would say that the rhetoric from the Armenian side has also become more constructive. But once again, remember that the war is over and bargaining is now underway. Baku is trying as far as possible, and from a position of strength, to impose a configuration of peace that’s favourable to Azerbaijan, which is a source of justified concern to Armenia. But it’s understandable – the winning side always tries to impose peace on its own terms. We did exactly the same thing for 30 years. Ultimately, we can conclude that that policy was a failure. I think Baku would do well to learn from Yerevan’s mistakes.

— On the one hand, senior figures frequently talk about the ongoing exchange of proposals for the forthcoming draft peace agreement. On the other hand, and no less frequently, high-ranking officials accuse their counterparts of not wanting to move forward, of stalling and delaying the process, and of serving the respective interests of the powerful states which are their partners. How can these two positions be reconciled? Don’t they contradict each other? 

— They’ve been talking like that for the last 30 years. Once again, everything comes down to the fact that we have different views of peace. Yerevan needs security guarantees. Moreover, in the light of 12 September 2022 and Baku’s policy of “imposing peace by force”, this is an entirely legitimate concern. There’s one detail you need to understand: the actions and rhetoric of Baku since the war of 2020 completely confirm the narrative that exists within Armenian society about the existential threat that Azerbaijan, or at least the Aliyev regime, represents for Armenia. I’m not claiming that Azerbaijan actually has those intentions, but what’s important is how it’s viewed in Armenia. Similarly, threats towards Armenia are radicalising a certain section of Armenian society. The radical opinions you hear may not be widely popular in Armenia itself, but what’s important is how they’re perceived in Azerbaijan. They serve to support the narrative that exists among Azerbaijanis.

I would say that this kind of battle of narratives accompanies any protracted conflict. However, one way or another, some kind of diplomatic process is happening, although we have no idea of what is being discussed… The joint statement from the ministries of foreign affairs, for instance, came as a surprise.

— Is there any hope that Armenia and Azerbaijan will manage to sign a peace treaty this year? Is it clear what it would take for that to happen? 

— I don’t think so. A peace treaty will be signed, but it’s a long process. You can divide it into a number of stages. There’s step one: the delimitation of the borders, the establishment of mechanisms to ensure de facto peace on the ground. And then there’s step two: establishing the terms of a future peace treaty. At the moment, the parties can’t even agree a format for talks – Yerevan prefers the Western format, whereas Baku apparently favours the Moscow approach.

Not much is actually needed to conclude a peace treaty: guarantees of security and sovereignty for Armenia and the same guarantees for Azerbaijan. I understand that there is fear and mistrust in Azerbaijani society too. The way it looks from Armenia is that Baku is trying to break the backbone of the Armenian state for decades to come in order to neutralise any future attempts to revisit the conflict. And that’s why Armenia needs security guarantees, because Azerbaijan’s sovereignty cannot be assured at the expense of Armenia’s and vice versa. We need to understand that it’s a two-way process. Armenia has already renounced its territorial claims in relation to Azerbaijan and therefore expects the same level of constructive engagement from Azerbaijan. Any additional demands that would reduce Armenia’s sovereignty, be it economic dependence or extra-territorial corridors, are bound to cause disquiet in Armenia. It doesn’t matter what they mean in reality. I appreciate that this might just be a bluff – setting out the maximum demands in order to obtain the desired minimum, but I would say again that if you look at the situation from the Armenian perspective, that kind of rhetoric is a cause for concern.

— It’s understandable that there is a problem of trust between the two sides. For example, accusations about the aggressive intentions of their neighbour can still be heard today from both Yerevan and Baku. What’s the solution to this problem? Isn’t this the stumbling block that’s preventing Armenia and Azerbaijan from deciding to sign the final document?

— Not at all. It’s a completely natural consequence of 30 years of conflict. The main thing is that it shouldn’t disrupt the negotiating process. But if we’re talking about the diplomatic aspect of the conflict, the main stumbling block, in my opinion, is not so much mistrust as different visions of peace. Another obstacle is the fact that the parties are not doing a very good job of promoting peace. I don’t mean peace as the only alternative to war, but peace as mutually beneficial cooperation. Where and what are the parties willing to concede to each other and what will they get out of it? You have to market peace just like you would a business idea. If you’re going to get the conflicting parties interested in peace, they need to know how a state of peace will be better than a state of ‘cold’ war. Essentially, we’re at a point where neither side has anything to lose if no peace treaty is signed. The question should be rephrased: not what will we lose if no peace treaty is signed, but what will we gain if it is? But trust is more a matter of time. Mutual gestures of goodwill can really help to build trust between the parties.

— You mentioned the interesting initiative taken by the parties on 7 December 2023 when Baku and Yerevan issued a joint statement on prisoner exchange and Armenia’s agreement to the next international climate summit (COP) being held in Baku. How realistic do you think it is to persist with this approach? For example, could the parties come out with a similar joint statement to the effect that Baku and Yerevan intend to continue the peace negotiation process on an exclusively bilateral basis, without involving any foreign mediators, with all meetings taking place on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan? Do you think this is a realistic prospect in the current situation?

— If I’m honest, I was always in favour of direct talks. Simply because for 30 years we’ve tried all the possible formats on all the possible platforms – apart from direct talks. However, I’ve become more sceptical about the idea recently, for the reasons mentioned above. Baku, as the stronger party in such negotiations, would try to impose on Yerevan a configuration of peace that would be favourable to Azerbaijan. I think a peace concluded on one party’s terms won’t be a long-lasting peace. The geopolitical situation can and will change. In 20 years’ time the side that wasn’t happy with the terms of the peace treaty would demand to revisit it. So, in my opinion, what’s needed is something that corrects the power imbalance to achieve long-term peace. To be honest, the 7 December statement was completely unexpected and it does inspire hope that the two sides are being constructive. It’s one of those gestures of goodwill I mentioned earlier.

Rauf Orudzhev

Translated from Russian by Heather Stacey