Obstacles to mutual understanding between Armenia and Azerbaijan – Boris Navasardian and Rauf Garagezov

Not for the first time, the Yerevan and Baku Press Clubs are looking for common ground between the people of Armenia and Azerbaijan and seeking ways to overcome the many challenging consequences of more than 30 years of war and bloody confrontation. The geopolitical context has changed multiple times, both regionally and globally, but the mistrust between Armenians and Azerbaijanis remains. The explanation for this may be found not only in the historical clashes between the countries, including events from over a century ago and the hot and relatively ‘cold’ phases of the Karabakh conflict, but also in the processes taking place today. Another factor making the quest for models of peaceful coexistence more challenging are the attempts by a number of external forces to influence the situation for the purposes of maintaining or reinforcing their power in the South Caucasus region.

Psychological trauma and the negative stereotypes people have about each other are still very present in the consciousness of Armenians and Azerbaijanis. In a series of conversations on Civilnet as part of the ‘Line of Contact’ initiative run by the Yerevan and Baku Press Clubs, honorary president of the Yerevan Press Club, Boris Navasardyan, and Azerbaijani analyst and specialist in social psychology, Rauf Garagezov, discussed ways to overcome these challenges in the post-war period. The narratives that spread in this climate of animosity and hostility hinder mutual understanding and agreement on pressing issues for both countries and the region as a whole. These issues include the delimitation and demarcation of the border, the unblocking of communication routes, and the signing of a peace treaty, or at the very least the normalisation of relations, between Baku and Yerevan.

Rauf Garagezov sees mistrust as one of the main obstacles in relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan today. Nevertheless, he believes that a range of different narratives can be found in Azerbaijani society. Some people believe that the conflict is over and the two sides should sit down and work out a solution for the borders and agree forms of mutually beneficial coexistence. Meanwhile, at the other end of the spectrum, people continue to delve into history, dwelling on events that took place in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

According to Garagezov, the outcome of the war in the 1990s and the “occupation of Azerbaijani territory” had a “profound traumatic impact” on the Azerbaijani mentality. There is also a powerful narrative that, from time immemorial, Russia has helped the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis have always lost. This is the product of a colonial legacy that is still very present in the minds of the people. In Garagezov’s opinion, it is important to develop universal approaches as the basis for the process of agreeing the inter-state borders: “I think that, in accordance with international principles, the Alma-Ata Declaration is the way to resolve the issues in a civilised way and this should guide our work with the different communities.”

For his part, Boris Navasardyan highlighted the fact that the lack of trust allows considerable room for narratives which have deep roots in the consciousness of Armenians and, in parallel, in the minds of Azerbaijanis. Moreover, a range of issues are also emerging during the current processes. Navasardyan noted that there is a strong perception in Armenian society that the conversation about the borders today is fraught with serious contradictions. He says this perception is founded on a belief within Armenian society that the political elite and the majority of Azerbaijanis want to capitalise to the greatest extent possible on the outcome of the 44-day war and that Armenians fear that even the restoration of the border between the former Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) and the Azerbaijani SSR may not be enough to satisfy their neighbours. Therefore, regardless of who owned the Soviet-era territories, every effort should be made to resist anything that can be resisted. This is why the statement by Nikol Pashinyan on the return of four villages in the border zone in north-western Armenia and north-eastern Azerbaijan generates such deep resentment, criticism and opposition to the policy pursued by the government in Yerevan.

Navasardyan suggests that the parties should agree a firm position regarding the basis for the inter-governmental commission leading the negotiations about the delimitation and demarcation of the border: “I don’t think there is any alternative to the approach of adhering to the administrative borders that existed between the two Soviet republics at the dissolution of the USSR and this is an approach supported by the international community today. There doesn’t have to be a correlation with where Armenians and Azerbaijanis lived 30 years ago. After all, in many areas the population was mixed back then. This may not be an ideal solution but, unfortunately, war and hostility mean it’s not possible at this stage to give all Armenians and Azerbaijanis the right to return to their own particular homeland, irrespective of what side of the border it’s located on.

“Given the current circumstances, if we want to avoid future conflicts, the states’ territories should be based on the principle outlined above, which seems to be what both sides are saying. However, societal attitudes, together with narratives from the past and more recent ones, combine to hinder an understanding of the desirability of this particular border delineation method and acceptance of its adoption by consensus.”

Against this background, the two societies are also encountering propaganda messages from third countries, especially the Russian Federation. Russian propaganda tools are actively exploiting the situation around the four villages to ignite tensions between the negotiating parties.

As for the narrative that has taken root in Azerbaijani society that Russia has always helped the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis have therefore always lost, today it is Moscow that is opposing the models for a settlement proposed in the West. This makes sense, given Russia’s attitude towards the Alma-Ata Declaration, in the context of the war in Ukraine and its own ideas about the prospects for ending the bloodshed. Unfortunately, in recent times Azerbaijan has also come out against Western models and a certain congruence is emerging in the narratives disseminated through Russian propaganda and some Azerbaijani politicians, media and experts.

In this context Navasardyan is of the opinion that, in the interests of resolving the conflict, people who are active in the media should focus as much as possible on pragmatic approaches. In particular, he feels it would be helpful for them to refrain from voicing old ideas about ‘ancestral lands’, as this is unlikely to help to increase mutual understanding. In fact it’s more likely to make new phases of confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan irreversible.

According to Deputy Prime Minister of Armenia, Mher Grigoryan, who is co-chair of the bilateral Armenian-Azerbaijani delimitation and demarcation commission, although agreement has been reached about control of the renowned four villages being transferred to Azerbaijan, the technical details have not yet been resolved [The dialogue which formed the basis of this article took place before the final agreement had been concluded, ed.].

Yet in Navasardyan’s view, these technical details are highly significant. He believes that the automatic transformation of the Soviet-era border into the border between two independent states is impossible. The Soviet republics were separated from each other by a strip of land the thickness of a line drawn on paper with a pencil. A border between two states, on the other hand, requires certain infrastructure, which will occupy significant areas of land. This raises questions of how the location of this infrastructure will be decided and how it might affect economic activities, natural resource use and transport links that pass in close proximity to or across borders.

This is why, when discussing the technical details, it is essential to specify the principles underpinning how the administrative border will be transformed into the border between two states. According to Boris Navasardyan, exchanges of territory should be avoided so that the demarcation of living space can take place as efficiently as possible and with the minimum infringement of the rights of the border populations of Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, these principles are not always articulated and local communities are not told about them. Yet it is essential to establish conditions that facilitate a normal existence for both Armenians and Azerbaijanis in the border zone and that in future could even lead to a situation where it becomes much less profitable to think about war than to cooperate on development programmes.

Rauf Garagezov, again highlighting the influence of memories of the past, observed that the post-war situation is not conducive to friendship and that the recollection of losses and victims obstructs the path to compromise and finding common ground. Nevertheless, he agreed that it is crucial to approach the issues rationally, to establish the basic principles for the delimitation process and to find solutions that are mutually advantageous.

Navasardyan also drew attention to the existence in both Armenian and Azerbaijani society of narratives that indicate a tendency towards isolationism which can be seen on two levels. Firstly, there is national isolationism, whereby society would prefer to live in a ‘besieged fortress’ state and seek paths to development without opening up to its neighbours. This attitude was deep-seated on the Armenian side, with proponents for a long time espousing the theory that it was possible to prosper under a partial blockade. They thus justified their refusal to discuss models of conflict resolution, including various communication routes passing through Armenian territory from Azerbaijan to the West.

The second level is regional isolationism, manifested in particular through the 3+3 formula which proposes that the countries of the South Caucasus and three of their larger neighbours should resolve all the issues themselves, without allowing any ‘external’ players into the region. Navasardyan believes that this approach contradicts the idea of international cooperation: “Communication is essential to secure global trade and global economic cooperation. If we go down the route of regional isolation, we will drive ourselves into a dead end. After all, those actors who express an interest in our communication routes will want them to function in accordance with generally accepted rules, laws and standards, allowing them to be used effectively. National and regional isolationism prevent us from resolving issues and working on strategic programmes that would enable us to develop”.

Garagezov agreed with this, noting that Azerbaijan has gained valuable experience through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline project, which brought international investment to the country and facilitated development, in particular in the hydrocarbon sector. He felt that this experience could usefully be brought to bear on other regional programmes.

Translated from Russian by Heather Stacey